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Marcus Dillender

Potential Effects of the
Affordable Care Act on
Workers’ Compensation
This article draws from the author’s chapter in The
Economics of Health (Donald J. Meyer, ed.), which
was just published by the Upjohn Institute. See p. 7
for more information.

T

he passage of the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) represents one of the largest
overhauls to the U.S. health care system
since the introduction of Medicare and
Medicaid. Among the reform’s many
provisions are an employer mandate,
an individual mandate, an expansion
of Medicaid, subsidies for low-income
people to purchase coverage, and the
establishment of health insurance
exchanges. The ACA also reforms the
individual market and implements many
measures aimed at reducing medical
costs. Despite its many changes to the
health care system, the ACA largely
ignores workers’ compensation insurance,
which also deals with medical issues and
has an overlapping agenda with health
insurance. Although the ACA does not
address workers’ compensation, it could
have potentially major spillover effects
on these state-level programs. This
article considers the possible interactions
between workers’ compensation
insurance and the ACA.

Workers’ Compensation overvieW
Workers’ compensation insurance
pays all medical bills for individuals
with work-related injuries and diseases.

Because workers’ compensation is a
state-level program, each state’s is a
little different. In some states, private
insurance companies administer workers’
compensation, while in others, the states
are the sole providers of insurance. For
workers who miss more than 3–7 days
of work, workers’ compensation also
replaces lost wages through indemnity
benefits. The injured workers’ weekly
benefits are a function of their weekly
earnings and are subject to state-level
maximums. In all states except Texas
and Oklahoma, workers’ compensation
insurance is mandatory for employers.
In 2011, nearly 126 million workers
were covered by workers’ compensation
insurance (Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno
2013). Employers paid over $77 billion
for coverage, and workers received
over $60 billion from the system. The
majority of workers’ compensation
cases—around 76 percent—are medicalonly cases and do not involve payments
for missed work. Figure 1 shows
workers’ compensation spending on
medical and wage replacement over
time. Spending for wage replacement
has been falling since the early 1990s,
while medical spending has continued
to rise. The share of medical benefits as
a percentage of the total benefits paid
for workers’ compensation rose from
around 30 percent in the early 1980s to
approximately 50 percent in 2011.
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Figure 1 Workers’ Compensation Medical and Indemnity Benefits by Year
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SOURCE: Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno (2013).

the aCa’s potential effeCt on
Workers’ Compensation
Filing Claims
The ACA can affect claiming in a
variety of ways. As discussed later, it
can change the labor force composition
and affect the number of people who
have work-related injuries, but it can
also affect who files for workers’
compensation. People without health
insurance theoretically have an increased
incentive to claim that their medical
issues are work related even if they
are not so that workers’ compensation
will pay the bills. Thus, having health
insurance may lower the incidence
of people misclassifying non-workrelated injuries. But even if an injury
occurs at work, health insurance may
still deter workers from filing a claim
if they prefer not to file for workers’
compensation. If this theoretical
relationship between health insurance and
workers’ compensation claiming holds in
practice, the ACA will reduce workers’
compensation claims by expanding health
insurance coverage.
Empirical research tends to support
the notion that having health insurance
coverage makes people less likely to
file for workers’ compensation. Biddle

2

and Roberts (2003) surveyed Michigan
workers identified by physicians as
likely having work-related injuries. Of
these injured workers, only 30 percent
filed for workers’ compensation. Of
the 70 percent who did not file for
workers’ compensation, 36 percent cited
having health insurance as the reason.
Heaton (2012) studies the impact of
Massachusetts’s health insurance reform
on workers’ compensation by projecting
how many emergency room bills would
have been paid for by the state’s workers’
compensation system in the absence
of the 2006 reform based on 2005
Massachusetts data. Heaton finds that the
health care reform resulted in workers’
compensation paying for 5–10 percent
fewer emergency room medical bills.
In Dillender (2015a), I compare
workers in Texas just before and after
they turn 26, the age at which young
adults lose access to dependent coverage
under the ACA. This approach yields
estimates of the causal effect of health
insurance on workers’ compensation
filing. I find that immediately after people
turn 26, initial claims filed for injuries
with easy-to-delay reporting increase,
while the overall amount of medical
treatment that workers’ compensation
pays for increases by 8 percent. Despite
these increases, overall workers’

compensation medical costs do not rise
dramatically for 26-year-olds because the
majority of this increased care is for less
expensive services. These results suggest
that health insurance affects workers’
compensation filing, particularly at the
intensive margin, but not necessarily for
the types of services that drive medical
costs.
By influencing some people to file
claims with health insurance instead of
workers’ compensation, the ACA may
result in cost savings to the workers’
compensation system. However, the ACA
may also change the type of insurance
plans people have by encouraging the
use of more high-deductible plans
because it institutes a 40 percent excise
tax on health plans with individual
premiums above $10,200 and family
premiums above $27,500 starting in 2018
(Zuckerman 2010). Since people will
lack first-dollar coverage, they may be
more likely to shift claims onto workers’
compensation, which will still provide
first-dollar coverage.
Reimbursement Rates
One of the ACA’s measures aimed at
reducing Medicare costs is establishing
the Independent Payment Advisory
Board (IPAB), which will make
recommendations to cut Medicare
costs if they grow larger than the per
capita GDP plus one percentage point.
If Congress fails to pass an alternative
proposal with the same cost savings, the
IPAB recommendations will become law.
The IPAB curtailing Medicare costs by
cutting reimbursement rates could affect
workers’ compensation reimbursement
rates since some workers’ compensation
programs tie their workers’ compensation
reimbursement rates to Medicare’s.
While this provision of the ACA may
lower the amount of money workers’
compensation spends on medical
care, it may also cause providers in
these states to be less likely to accept
workers’ compensation patients since
they will receive less money for treating
them. Even in states that do not tie
their reimbursement rates to Medicare,
changes in Medicare rates may affect
workers’ compensation. Auerbach,
Heaton, and Brantley (2014) argue that
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when Medicare pays physicians less, it
may cause physicians to increase prices
for other payers or provide more services
to other patients that provide higher
margins. If Medicare no longer pays
providers for certain readmissions, it
may have the same effect if it decreases
physicians’ profits from Medicare
patients.
Labor Force Composition
Auerbach, Heaton, and Brantley
(2014) also argue that the ACA could
change the composition of the labor
force. A large literature in economics
finds that the need for health insurance
has induced people to participate in
the labor force (Antwi, Moriya, and
Simon 2013; Blau and Gilleskie 2001;
Buchmueller and Carpenter 2012;
Dillender 2015b; Nyce et al. 2013;
Strumpf 2010). Prior to the ACA,
there were few good health insurance
options for the near elderly outside of
employment. Auerbach, Heaton, and
Brantley argue that the exchanges and
subsidies will allow older people to retire
sooner, which may reduce costs since
older workers typically take longer to
recover from injuries and require more
treatment.
Population Health
If the ACA improves people’s health,
it may lower the likelihood that people
suffer injuries while at work. The notion
that health insurance improves health
finds broad empirical suport (Card,
Dobkin, and Maestas 2009; Doyle
2005; Finkelstein et al. 2012), and
Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) find
that people reported being in better health
as a result of the Massachusetts reform.
The ACA also has a focus on prevention
by eliminating copayments for preventive
services and including an annual wellness
visit as a part of Medicare.
Identifying More Efficient Treatment
By identifying effective treatments and
digitizing medical records, the ACA has
the potential to lower costs for medical
care paid under workers’ compensation.
An example of one of the ACA’s
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strategies to make medical treatment less
expensive is the establishment of the
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research
Institute, which focuses on identifying
effective treatments. The ACA also
implements rules that establish electronic
health records, which could also reduce
costs while improving care.
Shared Medical Resources
A potential issue with the dramatic
increase in insurance coverage promised
by the ACA is that it will put more stress
on existing medical resources. Hofer,
Abraham, and Moscovice (2011) point
out that there was already a shortage of
primary care doctors before the ACA and
suggest that the increased demand from
the ACA could increase the shortages.
Huang and Finegold (2013) find that
certain areas will be hit hard by an
increase in demand. They estimate that
7 million people live in areas where
demand for primary care may exceed
supply by 10 percent after the ACA.
Physician shortages may increase wait
times for injured workers before they can
receive medical care.

ConClusion
By overhauling the health insurance
system and making many broad changes
to medical care, the ACA promises to
change the health care landscape. This
article describes the implications of
the ACA for workers’ compensation
insurance. It reviews the considerable
evidence that points to a reduction in the
claiming rate for workers’ compensation.
The evidence also suggests that health
insurance covers some of the costs that
workers’ compensation insurance was
previously paying.
Apart from affecting claiming
behavior, the ACA will likely affect
workers’ compensation insurance in
other ways as well. The ACA’s many
cost-saving measures—especially those
that aim to identify the most effective
treatments—will likely have spillover
effects. The aspects of the ACA that aim
to improve population health may also
result in fewer work-related injuries,
thereby saving workers’ compensation
programs money. One negative aspect of

the ACA for workers’ compensation is
that the increase in insurance coverage
may put more strain on medical
resources, which could make seeing a
doctor more difficult.
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2016 Early Career Research Award Winners
The Upjohn Institute announces the winners of the 2016 Early Career Research
Awards. These grants are intended to provide resources for junior faculty
(untenured and within six years of having earned a PhD) to carry out policyrelated research on labor market issues.
• Mark Borgschulte, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
“Labor Market and Program Participation Impacts of Health and Productivity
Shocks: Evidence from Forest Fire Smoke”
• Kevin Callison, Grand Valley State University
“The Effect of Paid Sick Leave Mandates on Labor and Health Outcomes”
• Bo Cowgill, Columbia University
“Labor Market Effects of Algorithmic Hiring: Evidence from Field and
Natural Experiments”
• Jeff Denning, Brigham Young University
“The Effects of Credit Constraints in College on Human Capital and
Labor Supply”
• Rafael Dix-Carneiro, Duke University
“The Impact of Labor Market Shocks on Household Financial Outcomes
and Migration”
• Ina Ganguli, University of Massachusetts Amherst
“Knowledge and Networking in Professional Labor Markets: Do Conferences
Impact Scientific Careers?”
• Seth Gershenson, American University
“Gender, Peer Advising, and College Success”
• John Horton, New York University
“The Effect of Demand Shocks on Human Capital Acquisition Strategies:
The Case of Adobe Flash Workers”
• L. Patten Mahler, Centre College
“Examining the Labor Market Effects of Public Pension Design”
• Ferran Elias Moreno, University of Copenhagen
“Understanding the Labor Market Effects of Legalizing
Undocumented Immigrants”
• Samuel Kleiner, Cornell University
“The Effects of Strikes on Hospital Production: Evidence from California”
• Olga Malkova, University of Kentucky
“The Effect of Pension Tax Reductions on Labor Supply”
• Mallory Vachon, Louisiana State University
“The Temporary Migration Response to Industry-Specific Shocks: Evidence
from the U.S. Shale Boom”

